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Stabilization Facility for Libya – towards recovery and peace

Annual Report

May – December 2016

Prepared for Contributing Donors (Canada, EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, UK, USA)

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Acronyms

DCA	Danish Church Aid
DDG	Danish Demining Group
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
GNA	Government of National Accord
HI	Handicap International
HoR	House of Representatives
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ICU	Intensive Care Unit
LibMAC	Libya Mine Action Command
LPA	Libya Political Agreement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PC	Presidency Council
PCi	Peaceful Change Initiative
SFL	Stabilization Facility for Libya
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
USA	United States of America

Executive Summary

The Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL) was launched in April 2016, and has attracted financial contributions to the tune of $32.4 million as of end-December 2016 (of which $29.8 million was paid by end-December 2016) and a pledge from Qatar of $2 million. UNDP and the Government of Libya are grateful to Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, UK and USA for their contributions. It aims to support the Government of National Accord (GNA) to build legitimacy among the Libyan population by providing quick rehabilitation of critical infrastructure, boosting the capacity of Municipalities and the engagement between the central government and Municipalities, and supporting local authorities in a more active role in peace-building. The Facility focuses on connecting the GNA to Municipalities, connecting Municipalities with local social partners, and connecting Government with engaged citizens. It works across the whole of Libya, helping the GNA to demonstrate a balance in its delivery of citizens' requirements of it.

The SFL Board approved first-round locations – Benghazi, Kikla and Obari – in May. The SFL selected Peaceful Change Initiative (PCi) as responsible partner to conduct initial conflict and damage assessments and to support prioritisation of infrastructure investments. The August SFL Board meeting approved packages of assistance for all three locations, and authorised assessments in Sebha and Sirte. The SFL prepared draft packages of infrastructure support in both, despite not being able to conduct sufficient consultations for confident prioritisation; the December Board approved both packages subject to the necessary consultation.

The replacement of elected Municipal Councils and Mayors by military-appointed Governors / "Mayors" in the East of Libya has undermined the SFL's scope to promote the legitimacy of the GNA there. The SFL has no dealings with the military Governors; the Board agreed on continued delivery of assistance in these areas, recognising that the political impact of refusing to support the citizens of these areas would be damaging. This confirms one of the main benefits of the SFL, as it serves all Libya with interventions in the West, East and South of the country.

Fighting continued in Benghazi throughout the period of this report, and in Sirte (against *Daesh*) until 5th December. Fighting also flared up in Sebha in December. Delivery by sea for locations in the West, centre and South of Libya was relatively straight-forward, but in the East, with Benghazi port inoperable, the choice between Tobruk – with delays as ships ride at anchor – and Alexandria – with a difficult road route thereafter – offered no quick options. Nevertheless, equipment has been successfully delivered to all first-round locations.

The SFL has published tenders for all the equipment, and almost all civil works, in the first-round locations. It has begun delivery of equipment in all three locations, and civil works have started in Benghazi. It has also begun to expand local social peace structures in the first-round locations.

It is too soon to expect the SFL to show results at Outcome and Impact level; the Facility is only eight months old and delivery has only been possible for five months. It has however generated considerable attention on social media and other communications. It has been able to deliver despite persistent blockages in decision-making within the Presidency Council (PC) and in the absence of a GNA approved by the House of Representatives (HoR).

Situational Background

The Stabilization Facility for Libya is an immediate stabilization initiative to support the Government of National Accord (GNA) to build legitimacy among the Libyan population through providing quick rehabilitation of critical infrastructure, by boosting the capacity of municipalities and the engagement between the central government and municipalities and supporting local authorities in taking a more active role in peace-building. The light infrastructure rehabilitation within the conflict affected areas will reverse the physical disruption caused by the conflict, and enable the reopening of key services at the municipal level. The quick recovery of businesses that are critical to the survival of whole communities will play a role in rebuilding confidence and reviving the economy. The capacity boost of municipalities will enable municipalities to take leadership in local stabilization efforts as the legitimate local governance authorities over the implementation period. Finally, new partnerships will enhance the capacity of municipalities and local communities to mediate local conflicts and start promoting a culture of peaceful resolution of conflicts to counter the violent trend.

The Facility focuses on connecting the GNA to Municipalities, connecting Municipalities with local social partners, and connecting Government with engaged citizens. In accordance with its main principle of engagement, it works across the whole of Libya, helping the GNA to demonstrate a balance in its delivery of citizens' requirements of it.

Results

Key results:

- ✓ Conflict and needs assessments conducted in five locations (Benghazi, Kikla and Obari; and Sebha and Sirte). Assessments include all elements of society, and model the inclusive approach which the SFL aims to inculcate in Municipalities
- ✓ Local peace structures are being developed in all three first-round locations, including social peace partnerships in Obari and Kikla
- ✓ 21 civil works to rehabilitate damaged infrastructure identified as priority; 18 brought to tender
- ✓ 31 equipment needs identified and prioritized; 22 brought to tender; and 3 transferred to Government during the reporting period (May-December 2016)
- ✓ 13 regular ambulances & 11 ICU ambulances procured to support access to health services in the three first-round Municipalities
- ✓ 8 garbage trucks procured, 5 transferred to Municipality, to enhance public health in those three Municipalities
- ✓ Communications departments of the GNA and Municipalities trained together contributed to develop a shared communications strategy
- ✓ Social media material resulted in over 13,000 interactions

Output 1

The Facility has established a partnership with Peaceful Change Initiative (PCi) to conduct social peace assessments and damage assessments in a range of locations. The two assessments were conducted in parallel, so that site damage assessments were focused on facilities which would be conflict-reducing and social peace assessments did not raise hopes of projects that would be technically infeasible, legally dubious, or prohibitively expensive. This aimed to reduce the risk of raising expectations that could not be met, and helped to ensure value for money by avoiding nugatory assessment efforts.

PCi did this in all three first-round locations (Benghazi, Kikla and Obari) and submitted recommendations in August. UNDP reviewed these and submitted recommendations to the Board meeting on 19th August. UNDP has mobilised teams in each location to deliver the equipment and infrastructure packages.

PCi did the same work in Sirte, though it was not able to conduct engineering assessments. UNDP provided a conflict assessment and needs assessment in Sebha. UNDP submitted recommendations on the basis of these assessments to the December meeting of the SFL Board; the Board approved the packages in principle, subject to the further consultations recommended in the proposal.

<u>Progress Overview</u>

The Facility completed by the end of 2016 the advertisement of equipment for the first round of locations (Benghazi, Kikla and Obari), except for medical equipment requiring Ministry of Health agreement. It also expects to issue tenders for all the civil works approved in first-round locations

except for cases in Benghazi where the task was changed (*e.g.* the al Majed school which was already tackled by the Municipality). The breakdown of output 1 is presented below by municipality. Table 1 on the following page provides an overview of progress on the procurement of equipment and civil works for all municipalities.

Table 1: Progress Overview by Municipality, 29th December 2016

Municipality	Value US$,000	Tendered US$,000
Goods and Equipment Procurement		
Benghazi	4,575	4,145
Kikla	1,250	840
Obari	670	430
Sebha	700	
Sirte	5,540	
Total, Equipment & Goods	**12,735**	**5,415**
Civil Works		
Benghazi	2,085	2,085
Kikla	750	750
Obari	3,230	3,230
Sebha	1,300	
Sirte	2,100	
Total Civil Works	**9,465**	**6,065**

Table 2: Expenditure by Municipality, 29th December 2016

(in US $,000)

Municipality	Board Approved Budget	Utilization	Balance	% Spent
Benghazi	6,660	3,184	3,476	48 %
Kikla	2,000	521	1,479	26 %
Obari	3,900	427	3,473	11 %
Sebha	2,000			
Sirte	7,640			
TOTAL	**22,200**	**4,132**	**8,428**	**19 %**

Benghazi

The August Board meeting approved the full package recommended by UNDP, including all three priority tiers. This includes civil works and equipment supply for five hospitals, a school, a court house, and two electrical substations. It also included equipment for the emergency services, refuse and sewage disposal, water supply, and street lighting and road safety.

Donors have made it clear that any engagement with the military Governors in the East is unacceptable. To work within that guidance, the Facility has operated at technical level, dealing with the Municipal Director of Projects (identified as point of contact by the Municipal civil servant who heads the Office of the Mayor).

UNDP have recruited a programme coordinator and an engineer in Benghazi, and Tatweer Research (a Benghazi-based subsidiary of LLIDF) are providing office support. Procurement of much of the required equipment is fairly advanced. Garbage trucks, ambulances, generators and solar panels have already been delivered; the first garbage trucks arrived by road from Alexandria, and the ambulances *via* Tobruk. However, the specifications of more specialised equipment (*e.g.* pumps, emergency vehicles, medical devices) required confirmation from the local partner (*e.g.* the sewage company, the emergency unit, or the relevant hospital Director) and in some cases the Ministry in Tripoli. Hence tenders for the pumps and emergency vehicles were only launched in late October and early November. However, all but the medical equipment and the solar street lighting were issued by year-end.

All 7 tenders for the civil works have appeared in local and international media and websites; of which three contracts have been signed and construction started during the year.

The remaining recommendations approved by the Board relate to "soft" issues such as relationships with IDPs inside and outside Benghazi, and the credibility of the Municipality in guiding their return. The evolution of Municipal governance, including the replacement of the elected Council and Mayor by a military Governor, may require revisiting of some of these. The Benghazi Coordinator is in regular touch with UNDP in Tunis to ensure both the safety of the SFL team of contractors on the ground and the effectiveness of the intervention. However, PCi have nevertheless begun work on those aspects that focus on community-level work. Meanwhile, careful liaison between UNDP communications and the Municipality media office has ensured that so far all Municipality communications have followed the agreed formulation "provided by the Stabilization Facility for Libya implemented by UNDP and supported by the international community".

In consultation with UNMAS and LibMAC, UNDP has established a small grant agreement with Danish Church Aid (DCA) to address the risk from explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Benghazi. DCA will conduct non-technical surveys of relevant areas and provide mine risk education in those areas.

The table presented below summarizes the status of procurement (equipment and civil works) for Benghazi. Photos of equipment procured and civil works follow the table.

Table 3: Benghazi Procurement Status

29th December 2016 (Equipment / Civil Works)

	Value US $	Tendered	Contract Issued / Received	Transferred
First tier priorities				
Benghazi Psychiatric Hospital *Only psychiatric hospital serving the East region (patients kept in a school now)* Includes civil works and equipment	650,000			
Benghazi Kidney Centre *Largest kidney centre serving 1500 patients per year* Includes civil works and equipment	560,000			
Al-Jala Trauma Hospital *Critical trauma hospital serving the East* Includes civil works and equipment. Once tendered, government provided budget for the civil works, therefore Al Gwarsha clinic will be rehabilitated	900,000	√		
Benghazi Garbage Collection (trucks & bins) *Lack of trucks and bins has led to garbage being littered throughout the city* (both have been tendered and garbage trucks procured and transferred to local government)	620,000	√	√	√
East Benghazi Court House *Critical court house in Benghazi serving a large area* Rehabilitation of Court House (civil works)	110,000	√	√	
Benghazi Civil Defence Department *Only department covering fires, road accidents and drowning* Includes civil works that has been tendered contract signed and equipment	600,000	√	√	
Repairs of Alaroba Street Railing *Many road accidents have taken place due to lack of street railing in Alaroba*	580,000	√		
Airport Street light posts	670,000	√		

Lack of street lighting is a security concern on the main road in Boatni				
Benghazi Radio Therapy Centre *Only radiotherapy centre serving the East* Includes civil works and equipment	320,000	√		
Sub-total	5,010,000			
Second tier priorities				
Almajed School *Severely damaged school in Laithi that usually accommodates 1,050 students* Tender was issued in 2016 for rehabilitation of Al-Majed school but government budget has covered the planned rehabilitation; new school will be identified	270,000	√		
Sidi Mansour Water Pumps *Critical alternate water supply for MMR*	180,000			
Benghazi Dermatology Hospital *Only dermatology centre serving the East* Includes only equipment	90,000			
Benghazi Sewage Network *Pumps to be used for removing sewerage from the streets*	700,000	√		
Sub-total	1,240,000			
Third tier priorities				
Laithi Electrical Substation (Bobtaina) *Damaged sub-station distributing electricity in Laithi* *Civil works*	90,000	√		
Buatni Electrical Substation *Damaged sub-station distributing electricity in Buatni* *Civil works*	320,000			
Sub-total	410,000			
Total cost	6,660,000			

Benghazi Equipment Procured

Delivered Ambulances

Benghazi Civil Works

Ongoing Rehabilitation Work in the Benghazi Radio Therapy Centre

BEFORE AFTER

Benghazi Court House Rehabilitation

Civil works on roof of hospitals for solar panel

Kikla

The August Board meeting approved the first-priority tier of assistance for Kikla, subject to a further round of consultation with the local authorities. This took place in Tunis on 6th and 7th September, co-chaired by the Ministry of Planning and the Mayor. It agreed on a revised priority list of interventions within the budget approved by the Board. The Board approved the resulting package on 9th December.

Procurement of much of the equipment in this revised list is in hand. A fire engine has already been delivered and transferred to the Municipality in a ceremony on 17th November. Of the 14 lots for equipment approved by the Board, 10 have been brought to tender; four of which have arrived to the port in Tripoli handover to the Municipality (1 fire engine, 2 ambulances, 60 desktop computers for the schools, and a solar power system to be installed at the Municipal office building. As in Benghazi, more specialised equipment required detailed specification from the relevant local authority, and sometimes approval from Tripoli. The Facility has secured the services of an engineer resident in Kikla, so all civil works have been brought to tender; and. The table below provides a summary of the procurement of equipment and civil works for Kikla.

Table 4: Kikla Procurement Status

29th December 2016 (Equipment / Civil Works)

Equipment	**Value US $**	**Tendered**	**Received**	**Transferred**
Ambulances (2)	130,000	√	√	
Fire Engine (1)	100,000	√	√	√
V sat connection for Municipality	50,000	√		
250 Kva Generators (2)	100,000	√		
5 KVA Solar Power System for Municipality Internet	50,000	√	√	
Minor Medical Equipment (Main hospital)	50,000	√		
Major Medical Equipment (Main hospital)	260,000	√		
School Furniture (five schools)	200,000			
2 Video projectors and 6 printers (for Martyrs & Khalifa Ahmed Schools)	40,000	√		
60 Desktop computers	60,000	√	√	
School laboratories for two schools	100,000			
University lab furniture and equipment	50,000			
Sport center equipment	50,000			
Civil Works	**Value US $**	**Tendered**	**Contract Issued**	**Completed**
Main Hospital Rehabilitation	350,000	√		
Prefab Medical Care Center for main hospital	150,000	√		
University Building Rehabilitation	150,000	√		
Sports center building repair	100,000	√		
4 Air conditioners (18,000 BTU for two school computer labs)	10,000	√		
Total	**2,000,000**			

In consultation with UNMAS and LibMAC, UNDP has established a small grant agreement with Handicap International (HI) to address the risk from ERW in Kikla. HI will conduct non-technical surveys of relevant areas and provide mine risk education in those areas. UNMAS and LibMAC also provided a mine risk awareness training session for the Mayor of Kikla and representatives from the Municipality on 15th, 16th and 17th June in Tunis.

Handover of Fire Truck to Kikla Municipality

Solar panels installation in Kikla, 7 January 2017

Obari

The August Board meeting approved the first-priority tier of assistance to Obari. This includes four schools (plus prefabricated classrooms in one school), the main hospital, a women's centre, and assistance with refuse collection, among other interventions.

Government outreach in communicating this package began with a meeting in September between the Ministry of Planning and the Mayor and Council members from Obari. In general, communications will take care to get the same message to all three groups, in the same terms, at the same time wherever possible. The Ministry intend to use the Social Councils as a forum for communication, in keeping with the "soft" recommendations from the PCi social peace assessment. PCi have begun a programme of support for this communications approach along these same lines.

Progress with implementation is along lines like Benghazi and Kikla. The Facility has contracted an engineer based in Obari and worked with him to develop tender documents for the civil works; as such, all 7 of the civil works approved by the Board have been advertised. A total of five lots for equipment were approved by the Board of which 3 have been brought to tender out of which, 2 have arrived in Tripoli, ready for onward delivery (1 garbage truck and 2 regular ambulances). The table below provides summary of procurement followed by pictures of handover.

Table 5: Obari Procurement Status

29th December 2016 (Equipment / Civil Works)

First tier priorities	Value US $	Tendered	Received	Transferred
New prefabricated school *Provision of prefabricated school in the grounds of Qurania School*	600,000	√		
Qurania School *Rehabilitation of mixed high school and elementary*	500,000	√		
Obari Almarkazeiha *Rehabilitation of school for 1,600 students*	400,000	√		
Obari Althanwia *Rehabilitation of school for 1,000 students*	450,000	√		
Obari general hospital & staff accommodation *Only hospital serving three municipalities in Obari region (Includes civil works & equipment)*	1,000,000	√	√	
Refuse disposal *Provision of one large garbage truck for Obari*	100,000	√	√	
Women's centre *Rehabilitation of Municipal centre for women*	150,000	√		
Public market *Rehabilitation of a public market place at the entrance to Obari*	650,000	√		
Pesticide cars *Mobile pesticide sprayers*	50,000			
Sub-total, Obari	**3,900,000**			

In consultation with UNMAS and LibMAC, UNDP has established a small grant agreement with Danish Demining Group (DDG) to address the risk from ERW in Obari. DDG will conduct non-technical surveys of relevant areas and provide mine risk education in those areas. DDG began the latter process with a mine risk education briefing for Municipal Council and social group members during a workshop in Tunis in August.

Sirte

PCi produced a draft report on social dynamics in Sirte which outlined the priorities expressed in focus group discussions. UNDP submitted to the Board on 9th December a draft report on conflict dynamics and a proposed package of assistance, subject to detailed consultations with the Municipal and Local Councils and social partners. Since the Board meeting, a Mayor has been elected and endorsed by the Ministry of Local Government. UNDP is developing a programme of consultation, and recruiting an engineer to conduct more detailed damage assessments of the

sites approved in principle. The package of intervention approved by the Board amounts to USD 7,64 million. This includes rehabilitation of the main hospital, 4 health centres, 2 schools as well as equipment such as mobile clinics, ambulances, generators, solar panels and water systems repairs.

6 ICU ambulances, 4 regular ambulances and generators have already been procured and shipped and are in UNDP warehouse in Tripoli waiting to be transferred to Sirte.

Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) pose a significant threat to early support for Sirte. The risk of deliberate seeding with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) is a particular concern. The scale of ERW clearance in Sirte is likely far to exceed the resources of the Facility, and management of the ERW (and especially IED) risk in Sirte requires significant technical expertise. UNMAS is coordinating an international effort in support of the demining effort required, including support from a number of donors for commercial demining operators to move in swiftly pending the development and deployment of local capacity; UNDP has participated in the coordination process and explained where the Facility expects to work. This coordination began in December 2016 and will continue until delivery is complete.

Sebha

The Facility mobilised an engineer to conduct damage assessment, drawing on a social peace assessment already conducted. UNDP presented a draft report to the Board on 9th December, and the Board approved in principle the package this proposed. UNDP is developing a programme of consultation involving all the main communities in Sebha (including Gadhadfa and Awlad Suleiman and other major Arab tribes as well as Tebu and Tuareg).

Output 2: capacity boost

Decision-making in the PC has often been slow. Neither the PC nor the GNA has shown great appetite, moreover, for publicising their achievements, including those through the SFL, nor has either body demonstrated the capacity to reach out to key stakeholders through non-media channels. The Facility has therefore tried to provide a boost to both delivery and communications capacities. For delivery, the SFL has recruited a Stabilization Delivery Advisor to help the PM to define his stabilization priorities, linked to the SFL, and to drive delivery. This post has been filled from late November; the Advisor has prepared a number of Decrees to establish relevant structures around the Prime Minister and has explored options for expanding other aspects of delivery. The Advisor's impact has however as yet been limited as Decrees prepared were not signed to date.

The Facility also sought to recruit an advisor to help the PC with its communications. Since other donors are supporting the PC's media effort, the SFL tried to recruit support for non-media outreach. However, no credible candidates applied, while those approached directly were unwilling to take on the task on a full-time or part-time basis.

At Municipal level, the initial support has been for planning capacity through on-the-job experience of prioritisation and consultation. In Benghazi, where the SFL has recruited both an excellent coordinator and a strong field engineer, regular dialogue with the Municipality technical

departments (based around the Municipal Director of Projects) is helping to build capacity in project management from project development to delivery.

In addition, the SFL has reached out to Municipal communications departments. It developed a training programme to improve Municipal capacity to generate effective communications products, and to plan and deliver an effective communications strategy. This training was initially conducted in late December 2016, with a fuller version taking place early in January 2017.

Output 3: local peace structures and conflict management capacity

In Benghazi, Kikla and Obari, UNDP's responsible partner PCi used their local experience of social structures and Municipal relationships to conduct the social peace analysis and conflict mapping for Output 1 (see p.7). Building on this, UNDP have contracted PCi to conduct work under Output 3 in these three locations. This has started with the identification of local social structures which can be used as the foundation for conflict monitoring and for the planning of peace support and conflict management mechanisms. As investments under Output 1 proceed, PCi are training a small group for each facility, consisting of the head of the facility, the relevant technical person from the Municipality, and the SFL engineer, to conduct the works in a conflict-sensitive manner and to communicate progress appropriately to enhance local peace. They are also bringing these small groups together so that the Municipality can maintain an overview of the peace-building impact of its project work.

In Obari and Benghazi, these structures build on the "social peace partnerships" which PCi have already established. PCi will use the Facility's additional resources to broaden these and to extend their capacity to monitor early warning signals. They will also help them to develop conflict reduction plans and to implement them, providing training in mediation and peace-building. There is strong demand for such training – Municipal staff in Obari raised the need, even in a seminar on communications – and PCi are recruiting additional capacity to meet demand.

USIP have indicated interest in partnering with the Facility in Sebha to support conflict-sensitive implementation and local capacity development in conflict monitoring and reduction.

Communications

UNDP developed an outline draft communications plan for the Facility, identifying its "big five" messages and the audiences and delivery leads. These were checked with the PC / GNA communications strategy, and fit well with the top three messages in that strategy. Consultations with the communications Departments in Kikla, Obari and Sebha confirmed that these messages are in principle fine, though cautions were expressed over delivery when some of them are aspirational (*e.g.* the first message, which may be the intent but does not fully reflect the reality of limited GNA control in the East of Libya). These messages are being further developed into a joint communications strategy between Municipality and GNA communications teams following the SFL training event in late December 2016 and early January 2017.

Table 6: SFL messages

	Primary audience	Secondary audience
The Presidency Council (PC) and GNA serve all Libyans alike	HoR, tribal elders, commanders	General public
The PC / GNA reflects the values of the 17th February revolution	Commanders, Misrata, HSC	*Thuwwar*, general public
The PC / GNA works with Municipalities to deliver services	Municipal Councils	HoR, HSC
The PC / GNA respects local leadership	Municipal Councils, tribal elders	Commanders, general public
The PC / GNA is delivering services to the people	General public	HoR, HSC, donors

UNDP recruited a communications specialist in November. Since then, as delivery has accelerated, the SFL has generated press releases, tweets and website stories which have generated extensive coverage.

FACEBOOK

Dec. 15, 2016: Some of the deliveries by the UNDP's Stabilization Facility in Libya



Nov. 26, 2016: Peaks show interaction by Facebook users for UNDP Libya posts at the time of posting

Nov. 24, 2016: SFL receives US$ 1 million from South Korea

TWITTER



Nov.9, 2016: UNDP Libya top tweets for November

YOUTUBE



Dec. 2016: Views on YouTube

WEBSITE

A few examples of press releases published on the UNDP Libya website in Nov. & Dec. 2016

Progress Towards Outputs (monitoring and evaluation)

The project so far potentially benefits nearly one million people, residents of the three first-round locations and those displaced into them. However, it is too soon to say how many will actually use the facilities made available (as opposed to having access to them if the need arises), since it is too soon to have usage data.

Baseline Perception Survey

In order to monitor the main intended Impact of the SFL, of reinforcing the legitimacy of GNA (and popular perception of the GNA delivering basic services to citizens), the SFL conducted a baseline perception survey. This should be followed by six-monthly repeat surveys, allowing assessment of trends in popular perceptions. The baseline measures the situation before SFL delivery began to be visible, so it represents the point of departure for the SFL's impact.

The SFL contracted Voluntas / Diwan to conduct a survey of perceptions of service delivery and Government legitimacy in the three first-round locations (Benghazi, Kikla and Obari) and three control locations (Bayda, Gharyan and Sebha). The survey was designed to have a 95% confidence interval of 5% for any single indicator. Face-to-face interviews took place in November and December 2016, and preliminary results became available in early January.

The survey asks about respondents' views about services in their area, and also about their perceptions of the basis for the appointment of the GNA and the two other "Governments" (the "Interim National Government" in Bayda and the "Government of National Salvation"). It gathers demographic and educational information, and also asks how they get their news and which sources of news they trust.

Because of "social desirability bias" – respondents tend to say what they think the interviewer wishes to hear – and perhaps also to security bias – respondents may say what they think is the safest answer – it is difficult to make judgements about absolute levels of stated perception. However, since these biases are typically relatively stable, trends in stated perception are more reliable as measures of effect. This is the norm in perception surveys, especially in conflict and post-conflict societies (see, for example, the Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Project for comparable concerns). Hence analysis of perceptions will only be reliably possible from the first follow-on round, to be conducted in May 2017.

Analysis of the baseline survey also presents internal methodological challenges. For example, the relationship between trust in Government and perceptions of Government delivery is complex: while the natural causation might seem to run from better service delivery to greater trust, there is evidence from elsewhere that low prior trust leads to low perceptions of service delivery even when service delivery may actually be better. Hence this relationship requires careful analytical methodology.

There are also some concerns over certain aspects of data reliability in the East. While some of the apparent uniformity of positive views may be due to local patriotism, and much to recent improvements in service delivery, there is nevertheless reason to doubt the accuracy of some

responses. This is reinforced by enumerator judgements of the veracity of responses and of the degree of discomfort of respondents (which is also reflected in high levels of non-response to some questions). However, as long as these factors are stable between rounds of the survey, inferences should still be cautiously possible.



Some provisional observations may nevertheless be attempted on the basis of the baseline survey, as assessments of the situation before the SFL began to deliver. First, reported perceptions of the GNA are very negative in the East, slightly higher in the South, and a little higher again in the West. Second, Municipal councils are reported more positively than any national Government in all regions. Similarly, local councils are seen as representing citizens' interests better than national bodies. Third, a majority of Libyans are reported as feeling that their situation is worse now than before 2011, with the share being markedly higher in the East. However, a higher share think matters will improve, with a much higher share in the East expecting the situation to improve over the coming three years.

Figure 1: Libyans remain optimistic about the future despite perceiving current situation as worse than pre-2011



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Figure 2: The GNA is distrusted by ~4/5 respondents while only ~2/5 distrust the judiciary, police and military



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Figure 3: Hospitals and education are the most needed services, drinking water figures high in Kikla



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Figure 4: ~50% participate in elections.





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Figure 5: Less than 50% believe that elections were free and fair; few believe the GNA selection was free and fair



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Figure 6: TV is the most trusted sources and the most frequently used across regions



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Some analysis can be conducted which reduces the effect of social desirability and security biases. These indicate that, for example, trust in the GNA and perceptions of GNA performance are strongly linked, and both are positively linked to perceptions of service delivery (in particular refuse collection) and to general optimism about Libya's future. However, such analysis will only be genuinely significant when trend data become available in mid-2017.

Figure 7: Trust in GNA driven by general trust and optimism towards Libya's future



Figure 8: Perceived Fairness of GNA selection and its performance, key drivers of its right to represent Libya



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Challenges and Responses

Progress in 2016 was not easy. The appointment of military Governors / "Mayors" in the East of Libya has made it difficult to engage at that level, while the deepening split between the PC / GNA in Tripoli and the House of Representatives (HoR) and the associated "Interim National Government" (ING) in the East meant delivery at technical level without the involvement of the PC/GNA.

Political context

The Facility was fortunate to have the Prime Minister chair its opening meeting, and to have his personal representative, H.E. Dr Taher Al-Jehaimi, to chair most of the other meetings. Dr Jehaimi's health sadly prevented him from chairing the last Board meeting of 2016, though he was represented by Ministry of Planning Director Essam Garbaa.

Tragically, violence also persisted in some target municipalities. Combat has continued throughout 2016 in Benghazi, though the SFL's work has pressed ahead despite this. Reports of killings in areas of Benghazi not affected by the fighting also undermine the desired political and peace-building impacts of the SFL.

Similarly, the fighting in Sebha in November, and the uneasy calm since, limited the ability of the SFL to recruit partners to help with consultations with the Municipality and social partners on the preliminary package endorsed by the Board. Consultations on priorities will therefore need to take place only in Tunis.

In Sirte, the battle to clear *Daesh* out of the city came to an end on 5th December. However, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), including deliberately seeded Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), continue to pose a threat to civilians and delay detailed engineering assessments.

Presidency Council / GNA Challenges

Unfortunately, the PC has not been able to reach agreement with the HoR on the formation of a GNA. The Government has also been unable to make good on its pledge to match $30 million of funding from donors for the Facility. Delays in GNA formation may also contribute to the difficulties in providing funding for Municipalities to enable them to deliver their revised responsibilities under Law 59; this may limit, for example, their ability to support the outreach and communications aspects of the SFL's work in target locations.

The SFL has responded to this challenge by delivering the maximum possible value for money from the existing funds. It has tried to ensure that investments require the minimum of continuing investment. It has also begun to build capacity in Municipal communications departments to design and deliver communications approaches within their budgets, using media – including "town hall" meetings and other local mechanisms – which are within their budgets.

In the East, meanwhile, the effective authorities reject any role for the PC / GNA as presently constituted. The Co-Chair, Dr Jehaimi, nevertheless decided that the Facility should deliver benefits in the East, even if the PC / GNA could not claim political credit for its work. This has allowed the SFL to respond to this challenge, serving to connect the Government with citizens from whom they are otherwise divided. This enables the PC / GNA to deliver benefits to resident of the East when they have no other vehicles to reach out to them. In this way the SFL provides a unique function as a bridge between increasingly divided regions of the country.

As noted above (under Output 2), the PC and GNA have been reluctant to publicise their achievements through the SFL – or indeed through almost any other vehicle. This has limited the capacity of the SFL to achieve its political goal of enhancing the legitimacy of the GNA. The SFL has therefore worked with officials in the GNA communications team, with Municipal communications departments, and with officials in the Ministry of Planning to publicise delivery through press releases and social media. The SFL has thus been able to ensure that the terms of all publicity reflect appropriate nuances (*e.g.* the basis of SFL working in Municipalities where elected Mayors have been replaced by military Governors) while sustaining public visibility of GNA delivery in the West and South.

Local economic development and business rehabilitation

The SFL project document provides for support for recovery of critical businesses. However, this option was only prioritised in one case in one location, for repairs to a bank (and then not in the first tier of priorities). Businesses were not identified at all as priorities.

That may be because of the emphasis placed on all facilities being relevant to all communities. There are also obvious conflict risks in financing the return to business of one enterprise while not providing the same support to a competing business nearby. Hence it may not be surprising that consultations focused on conflict reduction eschewed this option. However, the consultations also highlighted the conflict risks posed by youth unemployment, making jobs a key stabilization issue.

The SFL's response to the challenge posed by the lack of priority attached to business rehabilitation during the consultations has therefore been to plan a survey, in each location, of economic opportunities. This will identify any key businesses (*e.g.* banks, transport hubs, or communications services – or indeed bakeries or pharmacies) whose absence handicaps local life or economic growth. It will also seek to identify opportunities for sustainable job creation. The SFL will not be able to deliver local economic development plans – they would need to extend well beyond the SFL's timetable of six to twelve months in a location – but it should be able to point the way, and to help Municipalities to develop their statements of requirements for Government or donors.

Finding the right locations

Choice of locations has been guided by the criteria established in the project document (p.12, Section IV):

1. Geographic balance to cover areas from the East, South and West Libya;
2. Functioning local authority structure in place in the municipality;
3. Commitment by the local authority to peace and political process;
4. Area affected by and/or prone to conflict;
5. Identified needs can be addressed through quick-impact interventions;
6. Stable enough security situation for implementation of activities to take place;
7. Highest impact or catalytic value of the interventions.

Selection initially gave particular weight to the first six, and perhaps paid less attention to the seventh in terms of location (as opposed to specific investments in the location). In view of the importance of the overall objective, the selection of second-round locations demonstrated a readiness to focus on the catalytic value of SFL engagement in a location – for example, the importance of the recovery of basic service in Sirte, to allow return and prevent a repeat of the disaffection and resentment which underlay the easy entry of *Daesh* into the city, is a clear example of a focus on the wider impact of an SFL engagement in a location.

Delivery difficulties and solutions

Delivery of equipment to Benghazi proved challenging. Delays in Tobruk port, with some vessels forced to ride at anchor for several days, required UNDP to explore alternatives. For the garbage trucks UNDP therefore decided to experiment with delivery *via* Alexandria, followed by road delivery through the border crossing point at Musaid / Saloum. Both routes proved slow; port delays in Tobruk were balanced by delays by the shipper in finding drivers to take the trucks to Libya by road. Nevertheless, both routes eventually resulted in safe delivery of the items to Benghazi.

Civil works tenders appeared in on-line sites and local media, including Municipal notice boards. However, in some cases there were very few bidders. In others the range of prices suggested that some bidders did not fully appreciate the nature of the task, or lacked confidence in the realism of the offer. Nevertheless, in all cases evaluated to date it has proved possible to identify a suitable contractor.

Sustainability

The SFL is constructed as an intermediate stabilization Facility, bridging the gap between short-term humanitarian aid and longer-term (and larger) reconstruction programmes. It has a duration in any location of six to twelve months. Hence it is not equipped to focus on sustainability; Output 2, for example, provides a capacity boost rather than capacity building.

Nevertheless, the SFL's approach seeks wherever possible to support political sustainability of governance linkages it supports (*e.g.* between Government and Municipalities) and social sustainability of other connections it builds (*e.g.* between citizens and Municipal and national authorities).

Progress with Output Indicators

The original Results and Resources Framework was developed for three target Municipalities. While some targets have been updated for the five locations now approved, setting targets for the first and second rounds involves combining operations at different stages of maturity. Hence some targets are only for first-round locations. The tables below summarize progress under each output.

Output 1: conflict rehabilitated and recovery of critical businesses supported

Indicator	**Annual Target**	**Progress**	**Status**
Number of municipal needs assessments conducted	*Rapid needs assessment carried out in all municipalities where the project will be implemented*	Needs assessments conducted in all three locations approved by the Board in August 2016 Two additional locations were approved by Board on 9th December – needs assessments will be carried out in 1st Quarter of 2017.	Fully Achieved
Number of light infrastructure rehabilitated	100% of agreed light infrastructure works completed in the selected municipalities	See p.7-17	On track for completion of all civil works in 2017.
Number of equipment provided	100% of the agreed equipment provided	See p.7-17	On track for transfer of all equipment to the municipal government in 2017.

Number of critical businesses rehabilitated	100% of agreed MSMEs rehabilitated	0 %	Not achieved 19th August Board decided that basic social services be the priority. See *Challenges and Responses*, p.34
Overall achievement Overall progress on output 1 is on track. Most equipment has been delivered and contracts for civil works are broadly on schedule, though procurement of some specialized equipment is taking longer.			

Output 2: Immediate capacity boost to municipalities provided

Indicator	**Annual Target**	**Progress**	**Status**
Number of capacity assessments	Capacity gaps assessed in all municipalities where the programme is being implemented.	Needs assessments conducted in all three locations approved by the Board in August 2016. Two additional locations were approved by the Board on 9th December – needs assessments will be carried out in 1st Quarter of 2017.	Fully achieved
Number of technical experts deployed	Based on the agreed requirements, technical experts deployed in selected municipalities to build capacity.	SFL deployed an expert to the PC, Stabilization Delivery advisor	Not achieved SFL deployed a Stabilization Delivery Advisor to PC, See p 18, but no experts to municipalities

	Municipal strategic plans developed in all agreed locations	No progress	Not achieved
Number of local authorities with increased capacity		Communications experts from Obari, Kikla and Sebha participated in initial communications training.	Partially achieved
Overall achievement During the needs assessments and prioritization exercise, boosts to municipal capacity were not identified as a priority need, with the exception of communications.			Partially achieved

Output 3: Local conflict analysis, facilitation and mediation capacity strengthened

Indicator	**Annual Target**	**Progress**	**Status**
Number of municipal needs assessments conducted	Strategic partnerships with four NGOs working in Libya initiated.	Responsibility Party Agreements have been established with one NGO to conduct needs assessment; two MOUs signed.	On-track
Number of local assessments conducted	Localized conflict analysis completed in areas identified by the board.	Conflict analysis completed in all 5 municipalities approved by the Board in 2016	Fully Achieved
Number of civic engagement campaigns	At least two civic engagement campaigns led by youth organizations.	Through Responsibility Party Agreement activities were initiated that will provide foundation for engagement with youth and women's organizations and other civic groups.	Partially Achieved

Number of youth and women engaged		Women's groups and youth have been involved in the early stages of output 3 delivery	On track
Number of municipalities trained and engaged in conflict resolution efforts	Capacity of municipal and local leaders on conflict resolution enhanced	Implementing partner, PCi, has begun capacity building activities with municipalities and social groups	On track
Overall achievement: In the first four months following Board approval PCi have made reasonable progress in initiating work on output 3, laying the foundation for progress in 2017.			On track

Contribution to Longer-term Results

The SFL's theory of change includes the judgements that

a. *If* the government assumes leadership when it comes to defining the concept of stabilization, its approach, focus and operating structures; then Stabilization will truly Libyan-led and the process will be legitimate and sustainable.
b. *If* citizens (1) develop capacities to analyse situations and formulate solutions which engage with government and are supported by the government; and (2) increasingly feel that the government is providing them with physical, institutional and livelihood security in an open, transparent, equitable, and non-discriminatory manner; *then* they will progressively feel empowered to become agents of peaceful change and will start longer-term planning and investments in peace and livelihoods.
c. *If* (1) communities and the government are connected, and on this basis establish mutual responsibilities; and (2) state institutions are enabled to deliver the services demanded by the communities in an open, transparent, equitable, and non-discriminatory manner; *then* a critical mass of engaged citizens will be formed, trust will progressively emerge and the population will be less reliant on armed groups for protection, thus diminishing the mobilizing power of armed groups.
d. *If* (1) greater connection allows a relationship of trust to emerge between the government, municipalities and citizens; and (2) capacities to manage conflict peacefully are built, *then* Libyan stakeholders will be empowered to take the lead in stabilization, and longer-term peacebuilding and development.

At the strategic level:

e. *If* (1) the government and local authorities have the capacity to provide more and more relevant services through increased presence in stabilization zones; (2) the government and the local authorities are both increasingly recognized as the main service providers; and (3) government and Municipalities are increasingly able to connect with engaged citizens; *then* the government and the local authorities will be increasingly perceived as an enabling presence, the institutional insecurity endured by the population will decrease, and they will not need to resort to parallel strategies for their protection and the pursuit of their interests.

It is too soon to assess the accuracy of these judgements, but the actions of the SFL to date aim to support (b), (c), (d) and (e) directly, and through its working methods to support (a). The perception surveys conducted during the SFL's operations measure variables which should allow a test of the validity of these judgements.

Although it is not explicit in the theory of change, an implicit element of the SFL's intention is that the Government should gain legitimacy throughout Libya. This underlies, for example, the requirement that locations demonstrate a balance between West, East and South. Indeed, the SFL is now the only substantial instrument through which the PC delivers benefits for the whole country, including citizens in the East. While the authorities in the East reject the PC / GNA, the Co-Chair Dr Jehaimi decided that the SFL should deliver there even if the PC / GNA get no credit

for it. This has meant that the PC / GNA still connect with citizens in the East, whatever the public presentation.

Cross-cutting issues

Gender mainstreaming

Both the consultation processes and the perception monitoring have specific provisions for including the views of women. During prioritisation consultations involving the Municipal Council, the female Council members have also been included in the final prioritisation phase. Perhaps as a result, in one location the priority interventions include refurbishment of a women's centre, while a focus on employment for young men also reflects women's perception of the risk that unemployed young men present to women.

The SFL supports local peace structures in each location, and has agreed that women (and youths) should have a minimum level of representation in these structures (at least half as high again as at the start of the project in comparable structures).

All facilities are chosen with inclusion in mind. This includes ethnic, age and gender inclusivity – though of course not all facilities are equally relevant to all groups, with a sports facility in Kikla, for example, being more relevant to young people than to elders.

Partnerships

The structure of the SFL, with almost all Libya's major donors coming together regularly in the Board with the Government as Co-Chair, has enabled effective partnership and coordination. Board meetings have demonstrated the scope for political and policy partnership, for example in confronting the challenge of military replacement of elected Councils and mayors in the East. Programmatic coordination has also been made easier, for example in Sirte where the SFL and contributing donors have held regular discussions to ensure that key topics are covered and duplication avoided.

The SFL has launched responsible party partnerships with PCi on conflict and needs assessments, and with DCA, DDG and HI on mine risk reduction. It works closely with the UNDP Dialogue project on aspects of connecting Government to citizens, and draws on other UNDP projects on local governance assessments. Close liaison with UNICEF, WHO and other UN agencies, funds and programmes has been helpful in ensuring complementarity in activities such as selection of schools for refurbishment, identification of medical equipment needs *etc*. UNDP works closely with UNSMIL, whose Department of Political Affairs attends Board meetings, to ensure that the wider political goals of the SFL mesh smoothly with UNSMIL's other political endeavours; the SFL's political goal, after all, reflects UNSMIL's efforts in securing agreement on the Libya Political Agreement (LPA) and the GNA which flows from it.

Risks

Possible Risk	Rating	Mitigation Strategy & Effectiveness of Mitigation Strategy
Strategic		
Failure to deliver project activities undermines position of UNSMIL and UNDP within Libya	I = 4, P = 2	UNDP and UNSMIL work to ensure that project actions promised to GNA are realistic and delivered; project team work to manage expectations. To date delivery has met expectations sufficiently to mitigate this risk completely.
Project activities overlap with actions by other members of the international community.	I = 3, P = 2	Project team uses existing coordination mechanisms to ensure complementarity and coordination of project activities with other interventions. Since major donors active in Libya are also contributors to the SFL, Board discussions (formal and informal) provide sufficient fora to mitigate this risk so far. Board discussions (formal and informal) also serve as an effective coordination mechanism.
Political		
GNA is not endorsed by the HoR and is unable to establish itself.	I = 4, P=3	The project can work with the Presidency Council in place given the Security Council Resolution 2259 (2015). The PC has frequently been deadlocked, so decision-making (including on GNA appointments) has been slow. However, to date PC decisions affecting the SFL have been sufficiently swift to enable continued delivery. The co-Chair (and GNA Minister-designate of Planning) decided on the political approach to military Governors in the East.
Adverse public reaction to international support to GNA	I = 2, P = 1	UNDP is working with GNA and Municipal communications teams on a common communications strategy. Municipal communications to date have reflected agreed lines, without evidence of this concern. UNDP has rebuttal material ready if required.
Security		
Deterioration in security situation negatively affects project delivery.	I = 4, P = 3	UNDP continually assesses situation and makes recommendations to SFL Board on appropriate adjustments to project activities. Operations in Sebha have been significantly delayed by recent fighting. The SFL's profile in Benghazi has been lowered to ensure staff safety – with the approval of the Board.
Financial		

Resource mobilisation does not succeed in fully funding all project activities.	I = 3, P = 2	Activities can still be started within Libya in the three first-round locations; new sites can be included within the limits of available funding. A wider coverage would enhance the SFL's political impact, so this mitigation strategy enables delivery at Output level, but does not entirely mitigate the Impact risk.
Organizational		
Third party contractors are unable to identify personnel to travel to Libya	I = 4, P = 2	UNDP can supplement company pools with candidates from HQ and other sources. Under current security conditions this risk has not yet become critical Relevant national personnel were contracted in all locations (engineers and programme coordinators). However, if security deteriorates sharply, this risk would become more acute. UNDP monitors the situation continually.
Recruitment of qualified project staff takes longer than expected.	I = 3, P = 2	UNDP utilizes fast-track recruitment processes in line with UNDP rules and regulations. To date recruitment met expectations with relevant international and national project staff was contracted in a timely manner. UNDP deployed an interim project manager from the launch of the SFL until the full time UNDP Project Manager was recruited in September. The stabilization advisor was deployed in July 2016 with the support of the UK. Two engineers and a procurement specialist were already deployed in UNDP support Office in Tunis while a programme delivery specialist is being recruited. National personnel were contracted in all three locations in Libya: Kikla, Benghazi and Obari.

Lessons Identified

Stabilisation requires more than just service delivery

Stabilization doctrine refers to an inclusive political arrangement, state survival functions (notably macro-economic stability and basic security and justice), and expectation functions such as basic service delivery. The SFL is conceived as one element of a whole, supporting Government legitimacy through a contribution to meeting citizens' expectations.

While the SFL should be able to help the Government to deliver aspects of citizens' expectations, the wider context for the SFL is not as positive as was hoped when it was designed. An inclusive political arrangement still escapes the PC, while economic stabilisation remains elusive as a liquidity crunch and a massive budget deficit threaten Libya's economic well-being. Basic security and justice provision also remain beyond the PC's gift.

Hence one lesson for the SFL is that the desired Impact of stabilisation, and enhanced legitimacy, cannot be secured through the SFL's work alone. The other elements of stabilization are essential, and the SFL's intended Impact is likely to remain unattainable without them.

Nevertheless, the SFL can have an impact at local level both on the well-being of ordinary people and on public perceptions of government more broadly. While this may fall short of the full intended Impact, it may contribute to local stabilization and reduce the risks of conflict locally whatever the national context. This is all the more likely where local and national government are tenuously connected and perceptions of the legitimacy of local government may be relatively detached from national politics.

Local development requires both local and national support

Connections between the Government in Tripoli and Municipal authorities are weak. Government has been unable to provide funding (other than salaries) for Municipalities to deliver services, while the effects of the provisions of Law 59 on local government have remained unclear in practice.

The SFL aims to enhance the legitimacy of the national Government through action at local level. For this to be effective, the connections between national and local authorities need to be at least moderately effective and citizens need to perceive a linkage between better services at local level and a more effective and legitimate Government at national level.

The SFL has been able to enhance connections between local and national authorities at official level through national participation in local planning and delivery, and through shared communications efforts. This, especially where communications (both media and direct outreach through "town hall" meetings and other traditional fora) are effective in sending the same message.

However, full success in connecting national and local authorities, and in enhancing the legitimacy of the GNA through popular appreciation of its support for local service delivery, also requires the capacity of the GNA to deliver at least some funding for Municipalities to meet operating costs,

or to deliver requirements in kind (*e.g.* medicines) where appropriate. This lies beyond the SFL's gift.

Stabilization requires connecting across divides

One of the most worrying (and deepening) divides in Libya is between the recognised Government in Tripoli (the GNA) and the authorities in the East. As noted on p.31 above (*Challenges and Responses*), the SFL has offered the GNA a vehicle to serve citizens in the East whom they are not otherwise able to reach. Though the Governor of Benghazi is well aware of what the SFL is doing in the city, he has been content to allow it to work unhindered – and even to hold back from overtly claiming credit for SFL investments.

Where Government cannot reach a region, therefore, the SFL may become a rare opportunity – perhaps the only opportunity – for it to demonstrate its support for those regions, and its value to Libyan citizens in those regions. While this was not foreseen as a design feature of the SFL, it may prove a significant benefit for stabilization in Libya.

Communicate achievements not promises

Early in the SFL, UNDP developed core messages for the Facility in conjunction with a communications advisor to the GNA funded by a SFL Board member. Reflecting Libyan experience of publicity containing numerous promises which went unfulfilled, undermining the reputation of government and of public communications in general, these messages were designed for communication through delivery of actual products and services.

Before delivery started on the ground in October, UNDP deployed a communications advisor to generate substantial volumes of material (press releases, Facebook and twitter feeds, website stories *etc*.) and provide public visibility to SFL delivery on the ground. The communications advisor also initiated training for GNA and Municipal communications teams, linking them and helping them to develop a shared strategy (see Output 2, p.14).

Exploit synergies with other UNDP Libya programmes

Other UNDP Libya programmes, such as the political dialogue programme, share objectives with the SFL – such as enhancing Government-citizen connection and improving the legitimacy of the GNA. The SFL has financed a Stabilisation Delivery Advisor to support the Prime Minister in securing delivery of his stabilisation priorities (see Output 2, p.14), and in parallel the political dialogue project supported a pilot on citizen engagement methodology and a workshop on delivery of Government priorities. This synergy has demonstrated that UNDP Libya can exploit its coherent country strategy and the close working relationships of its teams to enhance the effectiveness of its overall programme.

Financial Position

Donor contributions as of 29th December 2016

(US$,000)

	Pledged	Signed agreements 29th December 2016	*Signed agreements 1/1/17 – 3/3/17*
CANADA	1,134		*1,134*
EUROPEAN UNION	5,611	5,611	
FRANCE	991	991	
GERMANY	10,863	10,863	
ITALY	2,212	2,212	
JAPAN	1,480		*1,480*
NETHERLANDS	2,173	2,173	
NORWAY	1,043	1,043	
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	1,000	1,000	
QATAR	2,000		
SWITZERLAND	250	250	
UNITED KINGDOM	1,628	1,628	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	4,000	4,000	
TOTAL	**34,385**	**29,771**	***2,614***

Financial Report

Financial Expenditure, Approved Annual Work Plan, 2016 – 2017

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	Budget Description	Approved Budget 2016	Budget Utilized, 2016
Output 1: Light infrastructure destroyed by conflict rehabilitated and recovery of critical businesses supported.	1.1. Support rehabilitation of light infrastructure in conflict affected municipalities	International Staff (61300)	992,943	369,778
		International Consultants (71200)	186,000	231,269
	1.1.1. Conduct needs assessments in selected municipalities to identify needs for rehabilitation	Service contracts – local staff (71400)	29,400	19,290
	1.1.2. Agree with municipalities on priority infrastructure in need of rehabilitation based on the quick needs assessment	Travel (71600)	285,000	132,701
	1.1.3. Undertake light repairs of key public infrastructure based on critical needs, such as clinics, police stations, water facilities, power grids, government buildings and access roads.	Contracts for construction & provision of equipment (72100)	12,639,000	4,229,928
	1.2 Activity: Support the recovery of critical businesses for the revival of the local economy	Project Direct Costing (64300 / 74598): Direct Procurement/Finance/Administrative management and program finance costs of UNDP Libya CO i.e. non-project staff	104,000	104,000

	1.2.1. Based on needs identified by the rapid assessment, rehabilitate businesses that were destroyed by the conflict and are critical to community interests and provide them with the related assets/equipment needed	Workshops for project initiation & prioritization of needs (75700)	230,000	67,030
	1.2.2. Provide critical and damaged equipment/asset replacement support to key businesses, such as stoves, ovens, generators or solar panels, ICT equipment etc.	Project Operational Costs; rent, utilities, IT, etc. (73100)	19,000	12,440
Sub-total, Output 1			**14,485,343**	**5,166,436**
Output 2 Immediate capacity boost to municipalities provided	2.1. Enhance municipality capacity through deployment of technical experts	International Staff (61300)	179,218	
	2.1.1. Finalize the municipal capacity building plan in dialogue with GNA and municipalities	Travel (71600)	246,222	
	2.1.2. Recruit and contract technical experts in the areas of inclusive and participatory coordination, planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and coordination, as well as other areas requested by municipal authorities, and deploy them to work within the municipalities	Contracts (72100)	1,500,000	243,311
	2.1.3. Facilitate dialogue between the local authorities and the GNA	Workshops (75700)	250,000	6,205
		Project Direct Costing (64300 / 74598): Direct Procurement/Finance/Administrative management and program finance costs of UNDP Libya CO i.e. non-project staff	61,000	26,997
		Project Operational Costs; rent, utilities, IT, etc. (73100)	12,000	12,960

Sub-total, Output 2			**2,248,440**	289,473
Output 3 Local conflict analysis, facilitation and mediation capacity strengthened	3.1. Monitor conflict dynamics and support local conflict resolution efforts	International Staff (61300)	186,000	
		Contracts for 3rd Party Monitoring (72100)	298,000	128,837
	3.1.1. Provide a grant to an NGO to work with local stakeholders to undertake local conflict analysis, training and monitoring of conflict dynamics	Agreement with PCi (71000)	543,000	330,259
	3.1.2. Develop indicators for monitoring and undertake monitoring of impact of the project on perceptions of population	Project Direct Costing (64300 / 74598): Direct Procurement/Finance/Administrative management and program finance costs of UNDP Libya CO i.e. non-project staff	45,000	
	3.1.3. Hire a third party company to undertake programme monitoring both at the perception level as well at the activity level	Project Operational Costs; rent, utilities, IT, etc. (73100)	10,000	10,071
	3.1.4. Support locally led conflict resolution initiatives led by civil society organizations			
	3.2 Develop municipal and community capacities and systems to manage local conflicts and promote peace			
	3.2.1. Build local pools of expertise in dialogue facilitation and mediation			
	3.2.2. Provide facilitation and mediation training to municipalities and other relevant local stakeholders			

	3.2.3. Support the establishment of inclusive local peace structures in pilot municipalities (to include municipalities, elders, tribal leaders, CSOs, local media, women & youth groups and other relevant groups) 3.2.4. Assist key local stakeholders to design and implement conflict reduction plans to address main local conflict drivers in pilot municipalities 3.2.5. Provide specific capacity development support to selected women members of local peace and security committees 3.2.6. Ensure youth full engagement and suitable representation in all conflict resolution and community security committees and activities		
Sub-total, Output 3		**1,082,000**	469,167
PROGRAM TOTAL		**17,815,783**	**5,925,075**
General Management Support (8%)		**1,425,263**	**396,617**
TOTAL BUDGET 2016-2017		**19,241,046**	**6,321,692**

SUMMARY EXPENDITURE (by Output)	**Approved Budget AWP 2016-2017**	**Utilization, 2016**	**Balance**
Output 1	14,485,343	5,166,436	9,318,907
Output 2	2,248,440	289,473	1,958,967
Output 3	1,082,000	469,167	612,833
TOTALS	**17,815,783**	**5,925,075**	**11,890,708**
GMS	1,425,263	396,617	
GRAND TOTAL	**19,241,046**	**6,321,692**	

final signed
workplan June 2016